Dmitri Alperovitch - Gaithersburg MD, US Sven Krasser - Atlanta GA, US Phyllis Adele Schneck - Reston VA, US Jonathan Torrez - Villa Rica GA, US
Assignee:
McAfee, Inc. - Santa Clara CA
International Classification:
G06F 15/173
US Classification:
709224, 709217, 709229
Abstract:
Methods, systems and apparatus, including computer programs encoded on a computer storage medium, for receiving, at a global server system, from each of a plurality of local network devices, network data specifying network communication activity at the local network device, wherein the plurality of local network devices collectively provide backbone communications facilities for multiple networks; aggregating, at the global server system, the network data from each of the local network devices; analyzing, at the global server system, the aggregated network data to identify network activities; generating, at the global server system, update data based on the analysis of the aggregated network data, the update data including instructions for the local network devices for processing network communications to or from the local network devices; and transmitting from the global server system the update data to the local network devices.
Adjusting Filter Or Classification Control Settings
Methods and systems for managing data communications are described. The method includes receiving a data communication; analyzing the data communication to determine a particular type of sender or recipient activity associated with the data communication based at least in part on an application of a plurality of tests to the data communication; assigning a total risk level to the data communication based at least in part on one or more risks associated with the particular type of sender or recipient activity and a tolerance for each of the one or more risks; comparing the total risk level assigned to the data communication with a maximum total acceptable level of risk; and allowing the data communication to be delivered to a recipient in response to the comparison indicating that the total risk level assigned to the data communication does not exceed the maximum total acceptable level of risk.
Dmitri Alperovitch - Gaithersburg MD, US George Robert Kurtz - Ladera Ranch CA, US David F. Diehl - Minneapolis MN, US Sven Krasser - Pasadena CA, US Adam S. Meyers - Washington DC, US
Assignee:
CROWDSTRIKE, INC. - Laguna Niguel CA
International Classification:
G06F 21/00
US Classification:
726 3
Abstract:
Techniques for social sharing security information between client entities forming a group are described herein. The group of client entities is formed as a result of a security server providing one or more secure mechanisms for forming a group among client entities, the client entities each belonging to a different organization. The security service then automatically shares security information of a client entity in the group with one or more other client entities in the group.
- Irvine CA, US Dmitri Alperovitch - Gaithersburg MD, US Amol Kulkarni - Bothell WA, US Jan Miller - Hamburg, DE Daniel Radu - Bucharest, RO
International Classification:
G06F 21/56
Abstract:
A security service can determine a synthetic context based at least in part on context data associated with a first malware sample, and detonate the first malware sample in the synthetic context to provide one or more first event records representing events performed by the first malware sample and detected during detonation. Additionally or alternatively, the security service can detonate the first malware sample and locate a second malware sample in a corpus based at least in part on the one or more first event records. Additionally or alternatively, the security service can receive event records representing events detected during a detonation of a first malware sample, the detonation based at least in part on context data, and locate a second malware sample in the corpus based at least in part on the one or more reference event records.
- Irvine CA, US Dmitri Alperovitch - Gaithersburg MD, US George Robert Kurtz - Ladera Ranch CA, US David F. Diehl - Minneapolis MN, US Sven Krasser - Los Angeles CA, US
Deception-based techniques for responding to security attacks are described herein. The techniques include transitioning a security attack to a monitored computing device posing as a computing device impacted by the security attack and enabling the adversary to obtain deceptive information from the monitored computing device. Also, the adversary may obtain a document configured to report identifying information of an entity opening the document, thereby identifying the adversary associated with the attack. Further, the techniques include determining that a domain specified in a domain name request is associated with malicious activity and responding to the request with a network address of a monitored computing device to cause the requesting process to communicate with the monitored computing device in place of an adversary server. Additionally, a service may monitor dormant domains names associated with malicious activity and, in response to a change, respond with an alert or a configuration update.
- Irvine CA, US Dmitri Alperovitch - Gaithersburg MD, US George Robert Kurtz - Ladera Ranch CA, US David F. Diehl - Minneapolis MN, US Sven Krasser - Los Angeles CA, US
Deception-based techniques for responding to security attacks are described herein. The techniques include transitioning a security attack to a monitored computing device posing as a computing device impacted by the security attack and enabling the adversary to obtain deceptive information from the monitored computing device. Also, the adversary may obtain a document configured to report identifying information of an entity opening the document, thereby identifying the adversary associated with the attack. Further, the techniques include determining that a domain specified in a domain name request is associated with malicious activity and responding to the request with a network address of a monitored computing device to cause the requesting process to communicate with the monitored computing device in place of an adversary server. Additionally, a service may monitor dormant domains names associated with malicious activity and, in response to a change, respond with an alert or a configuration update.
- Irvine CA, US Dmitri Alperovitch - Gaithersburg MD, US George Robert Kurtz - Ladera Ranch CA, US
International Classification:
G06F 21/56
Abstract:
A kernel-level security agent is described herein. The kernel-level security agent is configured to observe events, filter the observed events using configurable filters, route the filtered events to one or more event consumers, and utilize the one or more event consumers to take action based at least on one of the filtered events. In some implementations, the kernel-level security agent detects a first action associated with malicious code, gathers data about the malicious code, and in response to detecting subsequent action(s) of the malicious code, performs a preventative action. The kernel-level security agent may also deceive an adversary associated with malicious code. Further, the kernel-level security agent may utilize a model representing chains of execution activities and may take action based on those chains of execution activities.
- Irvine CA, US Dmitri Alperovitch - Gaithersburg MD, US George Robert Kurtz - Ladera Ranch CA, US
International Classification:
G06F 21/56 G06N 5/04
Abstract:
A security agent is described herein. The security agent is configured to observe events, filter the observed events using configurable filters, route the filtered events to one or more event consumers, and utilize the one or more event consumers to take action based at least on one of the filtered events. In some implementations, the security agent detects a first action associated with malicious code, gathers data about the malicious code, and in response to detecting subsequent action(s) of the malicious code, performs a preventative action. The security agent may also deceive an adversary associated with malicious code. Further, the security agent may utilize a model representing chains of execution activities and may take action based on those chains of execution activities.
Dragos, Inc.
Member of the Board of Directors
Scythe (Smfps, Inc.)
Member of the Board of Directors
National Security Institute - George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School
Visiting Fellow
The Cipher Brief
Cyber Advisory Board Member
Harvard's Belfer Center
Senior Fellow
Education:
Georgia Institute of Technology
Master of Science, Masters
Skills:
Computer Security Security Information Security Vulnerability Assessment Network Security Cloud Computing Intrusion Detection Penetration Testing Information Security Management Computer Forensics Enterprise Software Vulnerability Management Application Security Information Assurance Firewalls Pci Dss Technology Management Identity Management Encryption Public Speaking Malware Analysis Tcp/Ip Security Audits Internet Security Ids Ips Security Architecture Design Thought Leadership National Security Incident Response International Relations Dod Foreign Policy Security Studies Vpn Data Science Decision Sciences Ida Pro
Wikipedia References
Dmitri Alperovitch
Work:
Position:
Vice president • Executive Assistant
Business category:
Inventors
Education:
Specialty:
Director
Skills & Activities:
Skill:
Information security
Dmitri Alperovitch
Youtube
Dmitri Alperovitch on CISA:
It's the agency you think is responsible for securing at least the gov...
Duration:
4m 13s
Rep. Langevin and Dmitri Alperovitch on cyber...
With the rise in ransomware attacks and data breaches, cybersecurity h...
Duration:
50m 13s
How will the Ukraine war end? Mark Galeotti a...
Mark Galeotti, a Spectator contributor and director of Mayak Intellige...
Duration:
15m 45s
Dmitri Alperovitch: These are the Countries T...
Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder and CTO, CrowdStrike explains which cou...
Duration:
19m 39s
I think Russia is very likely to target Europ...
Dmitri Alperovitch, Silverado Policy Accelerator executive director, j...
Duration:
3m 33s
Dmitri Alperovitch on Cybersecurity & the Chi...
Foreign Affairs Focus on Cybersecurity & the Chinese Threat with Dmitr...
What he left out was that CrowdStrike is also a company with deep connections to Ukraine. CrowdStrikes chief technology officer and co-founder, Dmitri Alperovitch, is a Russian expat and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. The Atlantic Councils list of significant contributors includes Ukrain
Date: Dec 08, 2019
Category: Headlines
Source: Google
DNC Reports Attempted Cyberattack To Feds, Says No Compromise Of Voter Database
"We have not seen any significant activity yet from Russia against the midterm elections, in terms of actually launching disinformation campaigns," said Dmitri Alperovitch, founder of the digital security firm Crowdstrike.
Date: Aug 22, 2018
Category: Headlines
Source: Google
Russian Hackers Kept DNC Backdoor Longer Than Anyone Knew
Immediately afterwards, the Washington Post story appeared, and Crowdstrike CTO Dmitri Alperovitch published a technical account of the breach that left little room for doubt that Russia was behind the hacks. The blog post also ran down a list of the malware used in the intrusions, including the GRU
Date: Jul 14, 2018
Category: Headlines
Source: Google
Social media giants crack down on RT under Senate pressure
nton and the DNC, and was revealed to have paid for the notorious Steele Dossier. Another member of the projects senior advisory group is Dmitri Alperovitch, CEO of Crowdstrike, the private company hired by the DNC which originated the accusation that Russia hacked into the partys emails. Alperovit
Date: Jan 26, 2018
Category: World
Source: Google
The computer chip debacle: Businesses are scrambling
Some patches, including some provided by Microsoft, aren't available automatically because they can cause programs to crash, and business will need to make sure security tools like anti-virus software is compatible with the update, explained to Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder and CTO of CrowdStrike.
Date: Jan 05, 2018
Category: Sci/Tech
Source: Google
Russian government hackers do not appear to have targeted Vermont utility, say people close to investigation
No one should be making any attribution conclusions purely from the indicators in the [government] report, tweeted Dmitri Alperovitch, chief technology officer of CrowdStrike, which investigated the DNC hack and attributed it to the Russian government. It was all a jumbled mess.
Date: Jan 02, 2017
Category: Sci/Tech
Source: Google
Skeptics Doubt Ukraine Hack, Its Link to DNC Cyberattack
eted by the same hackers, that we call Fancy Bear, that targeted DNC, but this time they were targeting cellphones (belonging to the Ukrainian artillery men) to try to understand their location so that the Russian artillery forces can actually target them in the open battle, Dmitri Alperovitch, Crow