Freescale Semiconductor since Mar 2011
SoC Design Engineer
InterDigital Communications Sep 2009 - Feb 2011
Senior Staff Engineer
Freescale Semiconductor Jun 2007 - Jun 2009
Security Architect
Freescale Semiconductor Jun 2004 - Jun 2007
Digital IC Design
Motorola Sep 1995 - Jun 2004
Digital IC Design
Education:
National Technological University 2003
Master of Science, Computer Engineering
The University of Texas at Austin 1995
Bachelor of Science, Computer Engineering
Western State College 1987
Bachelor of Arts, Communication
Skills:
Computer Security Embedded Systems ASIC 3GPP LTE RTL coding ARM
Lawrence L. Case - Austin TX, US Asaf Ashkenazi - Austin TX, US Ruchir Chhabra - Austin TX, US Carlin R. Covey - Tempe AZ, US David H. Hartley - Seacombe Heights, AU Troy E. Mackie - Austin TX, US Alistair N. Muir - Austin TX, US Mark D. Redman - Gilbert AZ, US Thomas E. Tkacik - Phoenix AZ, US John J. Vaglica - Austin TX, US Rodney D. Ziolkowski - Austin TX, US
Assignee:
Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. - Austin TX
International Classification:
G06F 9/00
US Classification:
713168, 713182, 713185, 726 2
Abstract:
Under the direction of a first party, an integrated circuit (IC) device is configured to temporarily enable access to a debug interface of the IC device via authentication of the first party by a challenge/response process using a key of the IC device and a challenge value generated at the IC device. The first party then may conduct a software evaluation of the IC device via the debug interface. In response to failing to identify an issue with the IC device from the software evaluation, the first party can permanently enable open access to the debug interface while authenticated and provide the IC device to a second party. Under the direction of the second party, a hardware evaluation of the IC device is conducted via the debug interface that was permanently opened by the first party.
Systems, methods, and instrumentalities are disclosed to provide secure operations in an M2M device. An M2M device may receive an indication that an operation to be performed is security sensitive. The M2M device may determine that the operation is to be performed in a secure environment on the M2M device. The secure environment may be a logically distinct portion of the M2M device. The determination may be made in in accordance with a policy. For example, the M2M device may determine that the operation meets a requirement specified in the policy indicating that the operation is to be performed in the secure environment. The M2M device may perform the operation in the secure environment on the M2M device. The M2M device may store a result relating to the operation in the secure environment.
Platform Validation And Management Of Wireless Devices
Andreas U. Schmidt - Frankfurt am Main, DE Andreas Leicher - Frankfurt am Main, DE Inhyok Cha - Yardley PA, US Yogendra C. Shah - Exton PA, US Sudhir B. Pattar - Mount Laurel NJ, US Dolores F. Howry - Wayne PA, US David G. Greiner - New Hyde Park NY, US Lawrence Case - Royersford PA, US Michael V. Meyerstein - Ipswich, GB Louis J. Guccione - East Chester NY, US
Assignee:
INTERDIGITAL PATENT HOLDINGS, INC. - Wilmington DE
International Classification:
H04L 9/32
US Classification:
713168
Abstract:
Methods, components and apparatus for implementing platform validation and management (PVM) are disclosed. PVM provides the functionality and operations of a platform validation entity with remote management of devices by device management components and systems such as a home node-B management system or component. Example PVM operations bring devices into a secure target state before allowing connectivity and access to a core network.
Method And Apparatus For H(E)Nb Integrity Verification And Validation
Sudhir B. Pattar - Mount Laurel NJ, US Inhyok Cha - Yardley PA, US Andreas U. Schmidt - Frankfurt, DE Andreas Leicher - Frankfurt, DE Yogendra C. Shah - Exton PA, US Dolores F. Howry - Wayne PA, US David G. Greiner - New Hyde Park NY, US Lawrence L. Case - Royersford PA, US Michael V. Meyerstein - Ipswich, GB Louis J. Guccione - East Chester NY, US
Assignee:
INTERDIGITAL PATENT HOLDINGS, INC. - Wilmington DE
An apparatus and method for providing home evolved node-B (H(e)NB) integrity verification and validation using autonomous validation and semi-autonomous validation is disclosed herein.
Inhyok Cha - Yardley PA, US Yogendra C. Shah - Exton PA, US Lawrence Case - Austin TX, US
Assignee:
INTERDIGITAL PATENT HOLDINGS, INC. - Wilmington DE
International Classification:
G06F 21/20
US Classification:
726 6
Abstract:
Integrity validation of a network device may be performed. A network device comprising a secure hardware module, may receive a root key. The secure hardware module may also receive a first code measurement. The secure hardware module may provide a first key based on the root key and the first code measurement. The secure hardware module may receive a second code measurement and provide a second key based on the first key and the second code measurement. The release of keys based on code measurements may provide authentication in stages.
Sudhir B. Pattar - Mount Laurel NJ, US Inhyok Cha - Yardley PA, US Andreas Schmidt - Frankfurt am Main, DE Andreas Leicher - Frankfurt, DE Yogendra C. Shah - Exton PA, US Prabhakar R. Chitrapu - Blue Bell PA, US Lawrence Case - Austin TX, US
Assignee:
INTERDIGITAL PATENT HOLDINGS, INC. - Wilmington DE
International Classification:
G06F 21/00 G06F 15/16
US Classification:
726 1
Abstract:
Systems, methods, and instrumentalities are disclosed that provide for a gateway outside of a network domain to provide services to a plurality of devices. For example, the gateway may act as a management entity or as a proxy for the network domain. As a management entity, the gateway may perform a security function relating to each of the plurality of devices. The gateway may perform the security function without the network domain participating or having knowledge of the particular devices. As a proxy for the network, the gateway may receive a command from the network domain to perform a security function relating to each of a plurality of devices. The network may know the identity of each of the plurality of devices. The gateway may perform the security function for each of the plurality of devices and aggregate related information before sending the information to the network domain.
Alexander Reznik - Titusville NJ, US Oscar Lopez-Torres - King of Prussia PA, US Inhyok Cha - Yardley PA, US Lawrence Case - Austin TX, US Yogendra Shah - Exton PA, US
Assignee:
INTERDIGITAL PATENT HOLDINGS, INC. - Wilmington DE
International Classification:
G06F 17/00
US Classification:
726 1
Abstract:
Systems, methods, and apparatus are disclosed for coordinating enforcement of policies on a network and/or a wireless transmit/receive unit. The policies may include stakeholder-specific policies of one or more stakeholders that provide services on a user equipment. Enforcement of the stakeholder-specific policies may be securely coordinated using a policy coordination function. Systems, methods, and apparatus are also disclosed that include a network policy coordination function (NPCF) that coordinates service control policies and access control policies. The NPCF may coordinate enforcement of the service control policies for one or more service control entities and the access control policies for one or more access control entities.
Device Validation, Distress Indication, And Remediation
Yogendra C. Shah - Exton PA, US Lawrence Case - Austin TX, US Dolores F. Howry - Malvern PA, US Inhyok Cha - Yardley PA, US Andreas Leicher - Frankfurt, DE Andreas Schmidt - Frankfurtam Main, DE
A wireless communications device may be configured to perform integrity checking and interrogation with a network entity to isolate a portion of a failed component on the wireless network device for remediation. Once an integrity failure is determined on a component of the device, the device may identify a functionality associated with the component and indicate the failed functionality to the network entity. Both the wireless network device and the network entity may identify the failed functionality and/or failed component using a component-to-functionality map. After receiving an indication of an integrity failure at the device, the network entity may determine that one or more additional iterations of integrity checking may be performed at the device to narrow the scope of the integrity failure on the failed component. Once the integrity failure is isolated, the network entity may remediate a portion of the failed component on the wireless communications device.
Clovis, CA, USAFounder & Chairman at CargoBay, Inc. Past: CEO at MightyOak Capital, Founder & Managing Director at Lawrence Ventures LLC, Associate... Case Lawrence is an entrepreneur, CEO and thought leader who has won national awards for economic development and job creation.
Case is the founder and CEO... Case Lawrence is an entrepreneur, CEO and thought leader who has won national awards for economic development and job creation.
Case is the founder and CEO of CargoBay, a groundbreaking company that creates smart work and storage space for small business. CargoBay develops CargoBay, OfficeBay and...